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Abstract: The maintenance of livestock health depends on the combined actions of many different actors, both
within and across different regulatory frameworks. Prior work recognised that private risk management choices
have the ability to reduce the spread of infection to trading partners. We evaluate the efficiency of farmers’
alternative biosecurity choices in terms of their own-benefits from unilateral strategies and quantify the impact
they may have in filtering the disease externality of trade. We use bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) in England and
Scotland as a case study, since this provides an example of a situation where contrasting strategies for BVD
management occur between selling and purchasing farms. We use an agent-based bioeconomic model to assess
the payoff dependence of farmers connected by trade but using different BVD management strategies. We
compare three disease management actions: test-cull, test-cull with vaccination and vaccination alone. For a
two-farm trading situation, all actions carried out by the selling farm provide substantial benefits to the
purchasing farm in terms of disease avoided, with the greatest benefit resulting from test-culling with vacci-
nation on the selling farm. Likewise, unilateral disease strategies by purchasers can be effective in reducing
disease risks created through trade. We conclude that regulation needs to balance the trade-off between private
gains from those bearing the disease management costs and the positive spillover effects on others.
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INTRODUCTION
Globalisation has led to increased movement of goods and
commodities, including livestock and livestock products
(Knobler et al. 2006). More frequent and wider-ranging
movements of livestock and livestock products increases
both (1) the risks of new diseases being introduced,
resulting in a higher frequency of epidemics that can cause
great economic, animal welfare and environmental harm
(and if zoonotic, can threaten human health too) and (2)
the movement of endemic diseases, making the manage-
ment of such endemic diseases more difficult and costly
(Perry et al. 2013; Daszak et al. 2000). Reducing the risk of
disease and protecting livestock health requires coordinated
actions at international and national levels, with animal
trade posing a governance challenge as it can result in the
introduction of pathogens to previously disease-free areasCorrespondence to: Andrew M. Bate, e-mail: andrew.bate@york.ac.uk
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(e.g. Fe`vre et al. 2006; Perrings et al. 2010; Thompson et al.
2016). The role of individual producers (Gunn et al. 2008)
and the interaction of public and private interests (Hen-
nessy and Wolf 2015) are therefore critical.
For livestock diseases, the risk of an outbreak and
subsequent spread and control of a disease can be affected
considerably by farming practice across trading partners
(Leibler et al. 2009; Brennan and Christley 2012). However,
the management of endemic diseases can be challenging
and costly for livestock producers (Bennett 2003; Knight-
Jones and Rushton 2013). Economic theory views the
problem of spread of an infection as a form of biological
pollution (Daszak et al. 2000; Horan et al. 2002), where an
individual producer’s attempts to eradicate the disease on
their farm is undermined by the likelihood that the disease
will be reintroduced into the herd as a result of their
neighbour’s herd becoming infected or through trade of
infected animals. Conversely, a livestock producer’s
investment in biosecurity measures can reduce disease risk
and potential damages for neighbours and trading partners,
leading to positive externalities for these other parties and
the potential for free-riding on biosecurity (Hennessy and
Wolf 2015). This is known as a filterable externality because
a producer’s biosecurity choices filter the risk of disease
infection and damages to others (Shogren and Crocker
1991; Reeling and Horan 2015, 2017). Thus, strategic alli-
ances among producers may emerge as a result of these
bilateral interactions (Hennessy et al. 2005; Hennessy 2007;
Horan et al. 2015). More recently, Reeling and Horan
(2015) have shown that where individual producers have a
greater ability to secure the benefits from private actions to
control their own risk, greater levels of biosecurity strategic
relationships among producers and improved overall
biosecurity are more likely to emerge.
Given that alternative disease management strategies of
livestock disease can lead to different benefits and costs to
individual farmers, more information is needed on those
measures that can incentivise unilateral actions. Here, we
estimate the private benefits of self-protection from disease
management strategies and compare these to the benefits
that can be obtained from spillover effects of the biosecu-
rity actions of trading partners. We quantify the extent to
which disease damages resulting from trading with an in-
fected farm can be filtered by biosecurity actions carried
out by the seller, or by unilateral actions carried out by the
purchaser.
Our analysis is based on the illustrative case study of
bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD) across Scotland and England.
BVD is a disease of cattle that is endemic across the UK,
Europe and much of the rest of the cattle-producing world
that cases significant economic losses to the cattle industry
(Greiser-Wilke et al. 2003). Approaches to the control of
BVD are highly variable between countries, and in our
illustrative example, the different actions of sellers and
purchasers are a consequence of differing regulatory re-
gimes in the two countries. Following industry pressure,
Scotland has developed a control and eradication
scheme for BVD within Scotland (Scottish Government
2016). This involves compulsory movement restrictions on
cattle linked to annual testing and culling. In England, a
BVD test-and-cull (test-cull) scheme has recently been
introduced (BVDfree 2016), but this scheme is voluntary,
i.e. there is no regulatory force and thus no compulsory
movement restrictions behind it. Vaccination is also a
common management policy for BVD, with nearly 80% of
surveyed English cattle farmers saying they administer BVD
vaccines to at least some of their cattle (Cresswell et al.
2014). Therefore, management of BVD in England may
consist of doing nothing or various combinations of vac-
cination only, test-cull only and test-cull with vaccination.
BVD is normally a mild (transient) infection (TI) that
lasts around 2–3 weeks leading to lifelong immunity.
However, complications can arise during pregnancy
including abortions, miscarriages, birth defects and in utero
transmission resulting in a superinfectious persistently in-
fected (PI) foetus (Baker 1990; Lanyon et al. 2014). When
born, a PI calf will shed large quantities of BVD virus for all
of its life, and its lifespan is usually reduced to around 6–
18 months. Many PI cattle suffer from fatal mucosal dis-
ease, and PI cattle are usually ill-thrifty and slow growing.
Testing the status of foetuses cannot be done reliably,
meaning that PI foetuses can remain hidden in immune
pregnant cows/heifers (colloquially known as ‘Trojan
Cows’) until birth (Lanyon et al. 2014). BVD epidemics
often burn out in small and closed farms, a phenomenon
called ‘self-clearance’ by Lindberg and Houe (2005).
However, few farms are closed; each year around 65% of
beef herds and 55% of dairy herds in the UK purchase
replacement breeding cattle (Gates 2013, p. 113), whereas
Gates et al. (2013) found only 4% of Scottish beef suckler
herds had no replacement cattle purchases over a 3-year
period. Animals brought in through trade provide a path-
way for the introduction of BVD to a naı¨ve farm and a
supply of susceptible cattle for infected herds.
This case study illustrates the need to understand the
relative benefits to individual farmers of regulatory versus
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voluntary approaches to livestock disease control. There is
often a reticence on the part of many governments to im-
pose unilateral regulatory requirements that can be both
expensive and politically undesirable, given that the
maintenance of livestock health depends on the combined
actions of many different countries. By estimating the
benefits (i.e. reduced disease damages) and costs to farmers
of management strategies under regulatory requirements,
our work offers some insights on whether disease man-
agement strategies followed unilaterally produce good-en-
ough outcomes for farmers who bear the associated
biosecurity costs, as well as for their trading partners in
reducing disease damages (i.e. filtering the externality), and
thus their potential for limiting the damages of the disease
beyond the initial importer.
METHODS
BVD depends greatly on the destiny of a handful of PI cattle
within a herd. Such small numbers mean that each birth and
death could be the difference between the disease persisting
and ‘self-clearance’, and thus, the stochasticity around PI
births, deaths, disease transmission, demographics, move-
ment and management timing is important to understand
the efficiency of different disease management strategies
during a BVD epidemic. Consequently, we use a stochastic
agent-based model, written in NetLogo (version 5.3.1), to
model this bioeconomic problem. This model incorporates
disease dynamics, cattle population dynamics and a dis-
counted measure of day-to-day net benefits for the farm; the
latter encompasses revenues from selling or culling cattle as
well as disease-related costs and management costs for test-
culling and vaccination. We consider three alternative dis-
ease management strategies: vaccination only, test-cull only
and test-cull with vaccination, with an initial condition
where a PI calf is born in an otherwise susceptible herd, as
well as the conditions under which these regimes may have a
greater impact. This is done by comparing the farm’s expo-
nentially discounted daily net benefits over a 5-year period
obtained from undertaking one particular disease manage-
ment strategy with the net benefits arising from a ‘do noth-
ing’ option. Thus, ‘discounted net gains’ from following a
particular disease management strategy are equal to the dif-
ference between themonetary net benefits of investing in that
management strategy compared with a ‘do nothing’ ap-
proach in the presence of a BVD outbreak. A time frame of
5 years was chosen to allow enough time for BVD to spread
and damages be realised in the farms. The net gains from the
particular strategies derived from the model are computed
within the context of the total disease damages, i.e. the ability
of control to avert these damages. Disease damages are cal-
culated by comparing revenues between a situation with no
BVD outbreak and one with a BVD outbreak but no disease
management strategy in place. We refer to this difference as
the ‘net gains’ from a no-disease scenario and use this as the
basis for evaluating the relative effectiveness of alternative
disease management strategies in terms of how they compare
with the no-disease scenario in reducing disease damages.
In this section, we describe the key assumptions of the
bioeconomic model, with explicit parameter values given in
Table 1. For further details, an ODD protocol report
(Overview, Design concepts and Details, a standardised
method for agent-based models; Grimm et al. 2006, 2010)
is given in Appendix 1.
Farm Dynamics
Figure 1 shows the basic processes of a suckler beef farm.
Cattle are split into 2 classes: calves and breeders. All
newborn cattle up to weaning are categorised as calves. At
weaning, the farmer chooses either to keep the calf as a
breeder or sell it for finishing. Breeders remain on the farm
until they are culled for old age. The decision to keep calves
for breeding is modelled by keeping the breeding popula-
tion constant by replacing culled breeders. In the model,
this means that calves become breeders if there are fewer
than the target number of 60 breeders at weaning (Table 1);
otherwise, calves leave for finishing.
For simplicity, we assume all cattle are female and that
artificial insemination is used. Likewise, we assume no
mortality other than deaths related to BVD and those
scheduled for culling; a reasonable approximation given
that annual mortality is around 1–5% (CHAWG 2014; Nix
2014). We assume, in the absence of BVD, no abortions
occur and that pregnancy leads to the birth of one calf. We
ignore variable production costs since these costs are often
considered on a per-breeder-calf pairing basis and these
costs become constant under the constant breeder popu-
lation. Lastly, when we consider trade between farms, we
assume that trade timing is stochastic and consists of one
breeder or calf (also chosen at random) accompanied by a
payment from the purchasing farm to the selling farm. It is
this movement that could lead to an outbreak in the pur-
chasing farm if the moved animal is a PI, TI or Trojan cow.
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Disease Dynamics
Figure 1 demonstrates the structure of infection. The path-
way of infection for an individual cow is from susceptible to
infected to lifelong recovered. A transient infection lasts
around 2–3 weeks and is latent for the first 5–7 days (Baker
1990). This means the period of infectiousness is between 7
and 16 days. Cherry et al. (1998) found that latent infection
and colostral (mother’s milk) immunity had little effect on
disease dynamics, so for the purposes of our model, we as-
sume that transient infection lasts 12 days. We assume PI
mortality is stochastic with the chance any PI dying each day
being 1/365. Also, we assume that calves of PI breeders are
also PI (Lindberg and Houe 2005).
For breeders, complications from infection during
pregnancy need incorporating. Two more immune classes
for infection during current pregnancy are added; one class
for infection in the first 150 days of the current pregnancy
and the other the last 130 days. We assume the former class
results in either an abortion or a PI calf; whereas the latter
leads to the birth of a lifelong immune calf. In both cases,
the breeder moves to the usual lifelong immune stage at the
end of the pregnancy. Other issues like birth defects are
ignored or at least considered ‘abortions’ if culling is re-
quired. The probability of abortion varies in the literature,
from around 40% (Viet et al. 2004; Sørensen et al. 1995) to
80% (Cherry et al. 1998). Given the importance of abor-
tions and PI births to BVD epidemiology and costs, the
sensitivity of the results to variation in abortion rate is
examined in this paper.
We assume disease transmission occurs through ‘nose-
to-nose’ direct contact of susceptible cattle with PI or TI
cattle and that each animal within a farm can have such
contact with any other. We ignore other routes of trans-
Table 1. Summary of Parameter Values Used to Assess the Efficiency of BVD Control Strategies for Farmers’ Self-Protection and
Reducing Spillovers to Trading Partners.
Number of breeders 60 [AHDB (2016), includes 10–15 replacement heifers]
Weaning age 250 days (Nix 2014)
Time between conceptions 390 days (Nix 2014; CHAWG 2014)
Length of pregnancy 280 days
Age at first conception 450 days
Age for culling breeders 2930 days [Gates (2013, Chapter 6), Nix (2014)]
Recovery from disease 12 days (Baker 1990; Cherry et al. 1998)
Disease transmissibility of PIs 0.015 per animal per day (default)
Disease transmissibility of TIs 0.001 per animal per day (default, set to 1/15 of above)
Early/Late pregnancy threshold 150 days (Sørensen et al. 1995; Cherry et al. 1998; Viet et al. 2004)
Abortion rate 50% (default)
Mortality rate of PIs 1/365 per day (Duffell and Harkness 1985; Cherry et al. 1998; Viet et al. 2004)
Revenue from culling a breeder (PI or old age) £500 (Nix 2014)
Revenue from culling a PI calf £0 (no real demand for veal in UK)
Revenue from selling a calf at weaning £500 (Nix 2014)
Cost of TI £0.50 per animal per day [Gunn et al. (2004), adjusted by increase
in beef prices between 2002 and 2016]
Cost of PI £1.50 per animal per day [Gunn et al. (2004), as above]
Cost of testing £5 per tested animal (SAC 2016) (£25 for annual passed test)
Cost of vaccine £5 per breeder per year (farmacy.co.uk, Accessed: 3rd
August 2016) (£300 for annual vaccination of herd)
Frequency of testing and vaccination 365 days
Vaccine efficiency in abortion and PI reduction 85% (Newcomer et al. 2015)
Trade rate 0.02 per day [from 5 (median) and 9.3 (mean) of purchased replacement
cattle per year; Gates (2013), Chapter 6]
Discount rate 5% per annum
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mission like environmental and external sources of BVD.
Following Cherry et al. (1998), we model this transmission
as density-dependent. Other authors have used frequency-
dependent transmission (Viet et al. 2004; Ezanno et al.
2007; Courcoul and Ezanno 2010; Gates et al. 2014).
However, since the number of cattle does not change sig-
nificantly during the epidemic (especially for the first few
months), density-dependent transmission and frequency-
dependent transmission are equivalent.
Estimates of the transmissibility of BVD vary across the
literature. For example, Cherry et al. (1998) [using data
from Houe and Meyling 1991) and Viet et al. (2004)] (and
papers that follow: Ezanno et al. 2007; Courcoul and
Ezanno 2010; Gates et al. 2014; Damman et al. 2015) differ
in transmissibility parameters by a factor of around 6 (after
density or frequency-dependent rescaling). Given this, we
consider the sensitivity of the results to a range of different
transmissibilities (ranging from 0.005 to 0.03 per animal
per day). In line with others (Cherry et al. 1998; Viet et al.
2004), we assume that TIs are approximately 1/15th as
infectious as PIs.
Disease Control
The test-cull strategy we model is based around the regu-
latory regime in Scotland and the BVDfree scheme in
England (Scottish Government 2016; BVDfree 2016). To
implement this, the model includes an annual sampling test
to the oldest five calves, costing £25 (Table 1). If two or
more of these calves are found to be not susceptible, then
the farm is considered to have the disease. If that is the case,
all untested cattle are then tested and all PIs are culled; and
for the next year (until the next annual test), all newborns
are tested and culled if PI. If only one or no calves are
found to be not susceptible in the annual test, then disease-
free status remains and cattle can leave the farm without
being tested.
With respect to movement, test-culling farms can
purchase freely from other test-cullers, so there is mutual
recognition of testing farms. However, test-culling farms
purchasing from non-culling farms must test all purchased
cattle and cull all PIs (at the testing purchaser’s expense).
This means test-culling farms acquire BVD from farms that
do not test-cull by purchasing Trojan cows, and not PI
cattle. We assume tests have perfect sensitivity and speci-
ficity and that all tests and culls are instantaneous.
We assume vaccination does not prevent infection of
the vaccinated cow, but does prevent infection of the foe-
tus, leading to an 85% drop in abortions and PI calves
(Table 1, we have ignored all other causes of abortions);
thus, only breeders would be vaccinated.
Fig. 1. Phase diagram demon-
strating the epidemiological and
farm processes in a single closed
farm.
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Initial Condition
The initial condition is the birth of a PI calf (and immune
mother) with all other cattle susceptible on the farm. When
we consider two farms, the PI calf is born in the selling
farm, whereas the purchasing farm consists only of sus-
ceptible cattle. The ages of calves and breeders are uni-
formly distributed.
Model Output
For each day, the model computes the number of cattle by
disease and age class as well as the daily profits (which
includes revenues, disease-related costs and control costs).
Figure 2 examines how these classes and profits vary over
time following the birth of a PI calf. In essence, this enables
us to understand the BVD epidemic and its consequences,
establish how sensitive the model is to different abortion
rates and transmissibility parameters and justify our choice
for the default transmissibility parameter.
The results show the discounted net gains in a closed
farm from adopting different management strategies (vac-
cination only, test-cull only and test-cull with vaccination;
all fixed over time). Secondly, the results quantify how
unilateral strategies either by the selling farm and the
purchasing farm filter the externality of BVD from trade,
i.e. reducing disease associated damages passed on through
trade. This involves calculating the mean net gains of 100
simulations for each parameter-management combination.
Fig. 2. Time profiles for a single farm with no control under various disease transmissibilities (low 0.005, low-medium 0.01, medium 0.015,
high 0.03) showing (a) number of susceptible (solid line), transiently infected (dotted line) and recovered (dashed line) cattle during the
epidemic stage, (b) number of ‘recovered: early-pregnancy’ (dashed line) and persistently infecteds (PIs) (solid line), (c) number of calves and
(d) net revenue over 28 days. The transmissibility values are those in Table 1. Sample of 500 for each parameter value.
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RESULTS
Dynamics of a BVD Outbreak on a Single Suckler
Beef Farm
Figure 2a demonstrates that in the absence of control the
disease spreads quickly through the herd, making most of
the herd immune. For the case of high transmissibility, the
infection has spread to almost all the herd within 1 month
(at 40 days, about 90% of the herd is already immune). In
contrast, for low transmissibility, the infection spreads
much more slowly, with only about 40 immune cattle at
120 days.
Figure 2b demonstrates that as the disease spreads, the
number of cattle infected during early pregnancy increases
(dashed lines). These cases will later either result in abor-
tion or the birth of a PI calf. This means a smaller delayed
peak for PI (solid lines) occurs as the second generation of
PI calves are born. This also leads to many abortions,
resulting in a major decline in the number of calves
(Fig. 2c). In all these figures, the peaks/troughs are flatter
and wider for lower transmissibilities.
Figure 2d presents the monthly net revenues. In the
first months, there are small disease-related losses from TI
costs. This is followed by PIs being born a few months later,
reducing the net revenues due to PI costs. However, the
major drop in net revenues occurs even later when abor-
tions (and dead PI calves) lead to a shortage in weaned
calves for sale from day 380 onwards (depending on
transmissibility parameter). It is therefore the lack of calves
that provides the vast majority of the costs from BVD.
Overall, Fig. 2 shows that lower transmissibilities lead
to shallower but longer-lasting peaks and troughs. These
two factors (amount and duration of impact) largely cancel
each other out, and the total costs increases by only 15–
20% over the simulated period as a result of a sixfold in-
crease in transmissibility. This suggests that transmissibility
does not have a significant impact on the costs in the ab-
sence of controls. From now on we set medium transmis-
sibility as the default (Table 1), since this is most consistent
with the disease spreading through about 90% of the herd
in 3–4 months (Houe et al. 1993; Moerman et al. 1993).
Efficiency of Different Management Strategies in a
Single Closed Farm
Figure 3a shows the impact on a farm’s revenues from
adopting alternative management strategies in the presence
of a BVD outbreak over a 5-year period. The top line in
Fig. 3a gives the full extent of damages of the epidemic if do
nothing strategy is applied. For a default transmissibility of
0.015, this expected disease damages are around £15,000,
with a vaccination strategy, for example, able to avert about
75% of these damages. Test-culling alone results in a net
gain in farm revenues from applying this type of control
across all transmissibilities compared with doing nothing.
Its efficiency is lower for higher transmissibilities because in
this case BVD damage occurs before annual testing and
culling come into effect. In contrast, for lower transmissi-
bilities, annual testing and culling intervention could
happen in time to prevent further disease damages. How-
Fig. 3. Discounted net gains for a single closed farm after 5 years
following a BVD outbreak, under different disease management
strategies while varying the parameters for (a) transmissibility and
(b) abortion rate. Lines are means, and stars represent the upper and
lower quartiles. Sample of 100 for each parameter value. TC test-
culling, V vaccination, TC + V test-culling and vaccination, ND no
disease.
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ever, results show that test-culling and vaccination together
produce much larger gains than the test-cull strategy alone,
with net gains of nearly £12,000 at default transmissibility.
Vaccination alone produces a similar outcome, because
vaccination prevents the vast majority of abortions and new
PI calves, which are where the bulk of BVD damages occur.
Lower abortion rates are associated with higher dam-
ages (Fig. 3b). The expected impact of an abortion (where
abortion rate equals 1) on disease damages is less than the
expected impact from a PI calf birth (abortion rate equals
0) in a largely immune herd. Figure 3b also shows that test-
culling has only a small net gain if abortion rates are high,
but has a greater impact on reducing the impact on rev-
enues of the disease for lower abortion rates. This is
probably due to test-culling essentially increasing the
‘abortion’ rate to the value of one once detected. Vacci-
nation alone and test-culling with vaccination both have a
larger net gain across all abortion rates.
A corollary of lower damages for higher abortion rates
(ND line in Fig. 3) is that even when the herd is largely
immune, on average keeping a PI calf is more costly than
culling at birth (which is equivalent to an abortion). This
means that farmers that deliberately keep PI cattle to try
and boost herd immunity have their own ‘vaccination’ cost
without the reliability and security of normal vaccination
(Fray et al. 2000).
Impact of the Seller’s Management Strategy on the
Purchasing Farm
Figure 4 covers the positive externality of BVD on the
purchaser farm based on the different management con-
trols in the seller. It therefore represents the impact of the
seller’s alternative management options on the purchaser’s
revenues. Figure 4a, b both shows that all potential disease
management strategies carried out by the seller provide
substantial gains to the purchaser’s revenues, i.e. result in
filtering the externality. The net gains for the purchaser
farm when the seller is under compulsory test-cull mea-
sures are lower than if the seller adopts a management
regime that combines test-culling and vaccination. Thus,
for the purchaser, the adoption by the seller of a strategy
combining test-culling and vaccination is the next best
option to a disease-free situation on the seller farm. This
contrasts with the seller’s (weaker) private preference for
only vaccinating in a situation without regulatory measures
(Fig. 3). Note that the results have large interquartile ranges
since the purchasing farm either gets little to no BVD or a
full-blown BVD epidemic; there is not much in between.
Figure 4b demonstrates that abortion rate has an im-
pact on the purchasing farm’s revenues, with overall BVD
damages to the purchaser for buying cattle from an infected
seller being low if the abortion rates are high. This is be-
cause high abortion rates lead to very few PI cattle and
viable Trojan cows on the selling farm being passed on to
the purchasing farm (in particular, a perfect abortion rate
means the only PI is the first PI, which is very unlikely to be
moved to the other farm).
However, note that Fig. 4 assumes that the purchasing
farm does not vaccinate or test-cull. To further investigate
this, Table 2 gives the benefits for the purchasing farm
from each combination of management strategy in the
Fig. 4. Discounted net gains for the purchasing farm after 5 years
following a BVD outbreak when the trading partner (selling farm)
undertakes biosecurity management strategies, while varying the
parameters for (a) transmissibility and (b) abortion rate. The
purchasing farm has no biosecurity control. Sample of 100 for each
parameter value. TC test-culling, V vaccination, TC + V test-culling
and vaccination, ND no disease.
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selling and purchasing farms. Columns of Table 2
demonstrate that a purchasing farm would prefer buying
from farms that both test-cull and vaccinate, independent
of its own self-protected management strategy.
Benefits Arising from Self-Protection in the Pur-
chasing Farm
Figure 5 demonstrates that when a disease-infected selling
farm is doing no control, the highest net gains for a uni-
lateral strategy by the purchasing farm are achieved by
conducting vaccination alone or test-culling combined with
vaccination. For most parameter values, test-culling with
vaccination is a slightly more effective strategy than vacci-
nation alone, especially for lower abortion rates and
transmissibilities. In addition, for lower transmissibilities,
the test-cull strategy has a similar efficiency to the alter-
native strategies. Comparison of rows in Table 2 shows that
vaccination with or without test-culling yields benefits to
the purchasing farm, independent of the strategy of the
selling farm. As before, there is a large variability in the
simulation results leading to large interquartile ranges; the
distribution of disease loads and hence losses and gains are
all bimodal.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study has set out to evaluate the knock-on effects of
biosecurity actions of farmers on trading partners, partic-
ularly with respect to endemic diseases. Consistent with
previous work, we demonstrate that diseases can cause
externalities to trading partner in a way similar to biolog-
ical pollution (Daszak et al. 2000). We additionally show
that this pollution can be filtered by actions of the seller
that lead to reduced risk of spreading the disease (Reeling
and Horan 2017). However, we show that the management
strategy that is best for the seller does not necessarily cor-
respond to the strategy that best reduces the disease harm
to the purchaser (comparing Figs. 3 and 4).
Our results emphasise that farms can at least partially
protect themselves from acquiring the disease and/or
reducing the damages by taking biosecurity actions uni-
laterally (i.e. even if their trading partners do not). More-
over, regulation can constrain the choices of biosecurity
strategies available to individual farmers, impacting both
the level of self-protection, and the spread of disease
damages to others. Regulation needs to balance the trade-
off between private gains from farmers own risk manage-
ment and the positive knock-on effects their management
has on others. Conversely, a lack of coordination between
the actions of different farmers can generate significant
disease damages and undermine efforts to control or
eradicate endemic diseases (Shogren and Crocker 1991;
Epanchin-Niell 2017).
In addition to these general results, our paper has
specific policy implications for the control of BVD in the
trade between England and Scotland. Regulations that en-
force test-culling (like in Scotland) provide benefits to
individual farmers experiencing a BVD outbreak by re-
duced disease damages. However, both vaccination alone
and test-culling combined with vaccination are more effi-
cient in averting disease damages compared with test-cul-
Table 2. Mean Net Gains for the Purchasing Farm Depending on Biosecurity Self-Protective Measures and Controls of the Trading
Partner (Seller) Following Infection in the Selling Farm.
Seller Purchaser
No control Test-cull only Vaccination only Test-cull and vaccination
No control £0 £1815 £4344 £5199
(- £4721, £6131) (- £3426, £6413) (£2039, £6691) (£2784, £7577)
Test-cull only £2112 £2734 £5888 £6184
(- £4006, £7530) (- £2781, £7346) (£3654, £8183) (£4144, £8154)
Vaccination only £5187 £5719 £6665 £6634
(£2840, £9005) (£4152, £8182) (£4474, £8874) (£5214, £8174)
Test-cull and vaccination £5502 £6106 £6695 £7189
(£4033, £8204) (£4402, £9011) (£5085, £8361) (£5331, £9241)
Values are relative to the mean compared to a baseline when no control is applied. Interquartile range provided in brackets. Default parameter values used.
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ling alone. These results therefore show that for farmers
who are already vaccinating, a mandatory test-culling reg-
ulation does not seem to provide any additional private
gains in reducing disease impacts on farms’ profits.
We also quantify the extent to which the disease
damages by trading with a BVD-infected farm can be fil-
tered by biosecurity actions carried out by the selling farm.
Our results show that without regulatory restriction (i.e.
England) the test-culling strategy is less effective in filtering
the externality than vaccination alone, which is less effective
than test-culling with vaccination. If test-culling is com-
pulsory, as in Scotland, then the seller’s private best strategy
would be to combine test-culling with vaccination, since
this would result in significant reduction in disease dam-
ages to purchasers. Under a test-culling regulation strategy,
private risk management incentives align with their ability
to protect trading partners.
We also evaluated the effectiveness of unilateral actions
carried out by purchasing farms. The best unilateral strat-
egy to be implemented by a purchasing farm when trading
with an infected selling farm is either test-culling and
vaccination or vaccination alone, with the single most
effective option depending on disease transmissibility and
abortion rate.
Therefore, within the illustrative case of Scotland-
England regimes, this paper shows that the test-culling
regime enforced in Scotland provides private benefits for
individual farmers in reducing disease damage from a BVD
outbreak, but even larger reductions in the externality of
trade imposed upon a purchasing farm. Thus, this strategy
is particularly successful at reducing the spread and con-
sequent damages of BVD to trading farms, i.e. reducing the
spread of infection beyond an initial infected importer.
However, test-culling is not the best strategy that a pur-
chasing farm can conduct unilaterally to filter its damages
from trading with farms that undertake no disease man-
agement. Moreover, the lack of compulsory regulation in
England allows for farmers who neither test-cull nor vac-
cinate to cause significant damages to others, whatever the
disease management strategy, including those that unilat-
erally undertake test-culling.
We have focused our analysis on the benefits of
biosecurity under the condition that the disease is present.
However, this approach neglects cases where no outbreak
occurs, but disease management strategies are still applied
and maintained. Our exploration of this case (Appendix 2)
demonstrates that vaccination (with or without test-cul-
ling) results in positive expected net gains until the likeli-
hood of an outbreak falls below around 10% for a closed
farm. In contrast, test-culling alone has positive expected
net gains until the likelihood of the outbreak falls below 3%
and only has very small losses beyond this threshold value.
As BVD starts to become rare, test-culling will become
increasingly more effective and continue to provide net
gains for farmers beyond the point at which vaccination is
not economically worthwhile. Such changes in the effec-
tiveness of different disease management strategies are
important to consider when devising long-term livestock
health strategies.
For generality and simplicity, we ignore potential sea-
sonality of suckler beef farms. However, we suspect this
results in an overestimation of disease-related damages as
on a seasonal farm, births of PIs would correlate with other
Fig. 5. Discounted net gains for the purchasing farm after 5 years
following a BVD outbreak when applies unilaterally self-protective
disease management strategies, while varying the parameters for (a)
transmissibility and (b) abortion rate. The selling farm has no
biosecurity control. Sample of 100 for each parameter value. TC test-
culling, V vaccination, TC + V test-culling and vaccination, ND no
disease.
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births and thus miss the season where most breeders are in
early pregnancy. In addition, seasonality can affect trading
patterns, in terms of cattle of particular ages and pregnancy
status, which come with varying risks of spreading BVD
(Gates et al. 2014). Another limitation of this study is that
the price of cattle is independent of both the infection
status and the farm’s biosecurity strategy [i.e. price endo-
geneity has been ignored, unlike Horan et al. (2015)].
However, as infection is often hidden or mild, only the ill-
thrifty PIs would likely have a notable difference in price.
Additionally, disease management status is not always
public and this paper shows that purchaser could benefit
from getting the information on the biosecurity measures
applied by the seller. Armed with this information, the
purchaser can benefit from choosing sellers who implement
the best filtering strategies; this could lead to a price pre-
mium for those sellers who adopt the appropriate control
strategies.
Finally, we have explored here that under appropriate
conditions the benefits experienced by the purchaser as a
result of biosecurity measures adopted by a seller may even
exceed the private benefits these biosecurity measures bring
to the seller. This opens new avenues of research in terms of
assessing the efficiency of ex-border regulations to ex-
porters.
APPENDIX 1: ODD PROTOCOL OF MODEL
The model description follows the Overview, Design con-
cepts, Details (ODD) protocol (Grimm et al. 2006, 2010).
Overview
Purpose
This agent-based model of bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD)
within a beef farm includes age structure, disease dynamics,
control and disease dynamics. Given that BVD persists and
is spread by a few PI individuals, an agent-based model
with stochastic effects is important. The aim of this model
is to establish the distribution of disease dynamics and
economic cost given a variety of disease management
strategies scenarios across two farms.
Entities, State Variable and Scales
Each agent represents one bovid.
Time is discrete with time steps of 1 day. There is no
spatial dimension; each farm is seen as a separate patch.
Each agent has several variables: (1) Age-group. Agents
are either calves or breeders. (2) Age. Calves are between 0
and 250 days, whereas breeders are aged between 250 days
and 2930 days. (3) Disease-stage, set as 0 (susceptible), 1
(transiently infected), 2 (recovered), 3 (persistently in-
fected) and 4 (susceptible but vaccinated). (4) Disease age.
This is a counter of days of how long an agent is transiently
infected, starting at zero and at 12 days the agent recovers.
(5) Pregnancy-age is a counter of days that determines
when a breeder is pregnant, all breeders increase its preg-
nancy each day, and reset it to 0 when a calf is born at
365 days. (6) Early-pregnancy is a Boolean indicator that
states whether the breeder became infected during the first
5 months (pregnancy-age between 0 and 150). During
calving, this indicator is set to ‘false’. (7) Late-pregnancy is
a Boolean indicator, like early-pregnancy, but is for the last
4 months of pregnancy (pregnancy-age between 150 and
280). During calving, this indicator is set to ‘false’. (8)
Tested is a Boolean indicator for whether the agent has
been tested before. (9) Farm gives the agent’s current farm.
Process Overview and Scheduling
Following ‘Setup’, for each time step, the following pro-
cesses are done in this order.
1. Disease-progress
2. Ageing
3. Death–births
4. Movement
5. Testing
6. Vaccination
7. Cashflow
Design Concepts
Basic Principles
There are four main principles in this model. The first is the
age/class structure. All newborns are calves, whereas
breeders are culled when they are 2830 days old. When
calves mature around the age of 250 days, they either be-
come breeders or sold for finishing for £500. Farmers try to
replace the breeders they have lost using weaned calves;
consequently, calves become breeders when the farm has
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less than 60 breeders, whereas if the farm has 60 breeders,
weaned calves are sold for finishing.
This second is disease dynamics. Susceptible cattle get
infected (via density-dependent transmission) to become
transiently infected. After 12 days, the infection goes and
the cattle become immune. On top of this, there are per-
sistently (lifelong) infected (PI) cattle. These are created in
utero by the mother becoming infected during early preg-
nancy. If these cattle survive in the womb (abortions and
birth complication are very common), the newborn calf is
PI. These PIs are generally sicker than normal cattle and
have an expected lifespan of 1 year, although many live
much longer.
The third is control; test and cull and vaccination are
control methods used by various farms. Test and cull is
annual and will miss in utero PIs, whereas vaccination
prevention infection for breeders.
The fourth is the two-farm structure with movement
between the two farms.
Emergence The disease dynamics and costs should depend
on the use of controls but the nature of this is not known.
Adaptation Agents do not have adaptive behaviour.
Objectives Agents do not have objectives, although the
farmer does.
Learning Agents to not have adaptive behaviour. For
simplicity, we assume the farmer does not either.
Prediction No prediction by agents.
Sensing No sensing.
Interaction The only interaction between cattle is disease
transmission.
Stochasticity Transmission, PI mortality, abortions and
movement are stochastic (via Bernoulli trials). Initial con-
ditions have uniformly distributed ages with range
depending on class. This age is converted to give the
pregnancy age. The initial timing of annual tests and vac-
cination is a uniformly distributed (integer) between 0 and
364, inclusive. For two testing farms, we assume the annual
tests are independent of each other, whereas we assume two
vaccinating farms time their vaccinations together.
Collectives There are no collectives other than those with
given agent properties, e.g. breeders, infected.
Observation The essential output is the daily cashflow of
each farm. Additionally, the number of cattle by disease
stage, the number of breeders infected early in the current
pregnancy and the number of calves and breeders on each
farm can be useful outputs.
Details
Initialisation
The initial condition is the birth of PI from a Trojan cow in
an otherwise susceptible beef farm. (The other farm is also
naı¨ve with no Trojan cows or PIs.) We create 60 breeders
and 32 calves (the nearest integer to the long-term average
of calves from numerous simulations) for each farm.
All of agents have early-pregnancy and late-pregnancy
as false, but have random age uniformly distributed within
the age range for calves/breeders. On top of this, all calves
have pregnancy-age as -90, whereas all breeders have a
pregnancy age that corresponds with their calving timings,
i.e. for breeders younger than 730 days, set pregnancy-age
as ‘age - 340’, between 730 and 1120, set pregnancy-age as
‘age - 730’.
For farms with vaccination, set the disease stage of all
breeders old enough to be breeders during the last vacci-
nation to disease-stage = 4, i.e. for breeders with age
greater than 250 + vac-time, where vac-time is a number of
days since last vaccination (between 0 and 364). This vac-
time is the same on each farm. Test-time is the number of
days since last annual test. Test-time is independent for
each farm.
In the farm with the PI, the youngest calf has its age set
to zero and disease-stage set to 3 (i.e. a newborn PI) and
the breeder with lowest pregnancy-age that is at least
730 days old (i.e. had one pregnancy) has its pregnancy-age
set to zero and disease-stage set to 2 (i.e. breeder has just
given birth and is immune).
Input Data
There are no ‘Input data’.
Submodels
Setup combines the initialisation section with some visu-
alisation instructions.
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Disease-Progress For each susceptible (disease-stage = 0
or disease-stage = 4) agent, take each transiently infected
agent (with disease-age > 0, of the same farm) and get a
random number between 0 and 1 and check if this number
is less than the disease transmissibility of a TI. (This ran-
dom number is uniformly distributed, and this applies to
other random numbers.) If it is less than that, then set
disease-stage of the susceptible agent to 1. Otherwise, take
each PI agent and get a random number between 0 and 1
and check if this number is less than the disease trans-
missibility of a PI. If so, change the disease-stage of the
susceptible agent to 1.
When setting the disease-stage to one, we need to
check the pregnancy status for breeders and whether vac-
cination blocks this. For all breeders with disease-stage 1
and 15% of the time for breeders with disease-stage 4, we
do the following: If pregnancy-age is between 260 and 390,
set ‘late-pregnancy’ = true, and pregnancy-age 110 and
260, set ‘early-pregnancy’ = true, otherwise no change.
Following this, increase disease-age by one for all
transiently infected agents (disease-stage = 1). Those that
reach disease-age = 12 recover from this disease and be-
come immune, i.e. set disease-stage = 2.
Ageing It involves increasing the age of all agents by one,
as well as increasing the pregnancy-age of all breeders by
one. Following this, we check if calves have reached the age
of weaning (250 days). At 250 days, the calf becomes a
breeder if the total number of breeders on their farm is
< 60 (i.e. becomes a replacement for recently culled
breeder); otherwise, the calf is sold. The number of calves
sold is recorded for profit calculation.
Death–Births Firstly, check all PIs to see if they die from
disease-related mortality. For each PI, get a random
number between 0 and 1. If this number is less than 1/365
(i.e. expected lifespan of 1 year), then the agent dies. These
deaths are counted according to their age structure so that
these deaths can contribute to revenues/costs.
We also check for breeders reaching culling age of
2830 days. The number of breeder culls needs to be
counted so that the revenue can be calculated.
Following the deaths we deal with births. Check all
breeders and find those whose pregnancy-age of a breeder
hits 390 days. For these breeders, of both early-pregnancy
and late-pregnancy are false, a new susceptible (disease-
stage = 0) calf is born. If late-pregnancy is true, a new
immune (disease-stage = 2) calf is born. If early-pregnancy
is true, then get a random (uniformly distributed) number
between 0 and 1. If this number is less than prob-abort,
then the pregnancy ends by abortion, stillborn or other
complication. If this number is greater than prob-abort, a
new PI calf is born. All calves are born on the same farm as
their mother.
All the breeders that just gave birth reset the preg-
nancy-age to 0 and both early-pregnancy and late-preg-
nancy false.
Movement Movement depends on the scenario. In this
paper, we have two scenarios: 1-farm and 2-farm-1-way.
For 1-farm, this section does nothing. For 2-farm-1-way,
we consider moving cattle from farm 1 to farm 2.
If a random (uniformly distributed) number is be-
tween 0 and 1 compared with 0.02, then there is the chance
of movement. If this is higher, nothing happens. Else, we
will separate the case where either the seller tests but does
not have disease-free status or the buying farm tests from
other cases (since the former requires testing).
Pick a random agent from the selling farm. If the agent
has not been previously tested and the selling farm does not
test, then the buying farm pays for testing the agent. The
agent tested status is changed to true and farm status
changed to that of the buying farm. If this agent is PI, then
it gets culled. Otherwise, just change the agents farm status
to that of the buying farm.
An indicator that an agent has moved is used for the
profit.
Testing If test is set off (i.e. test = false) as a control
method, then this section does nothing.
Otherwise, we increase the time since last test, test-time
forward by one. If the farm’s disease-free status is false (i.e.
recent outbreak) all newborn calves are tested and culled if
PI. If test-time reaches the testfrequency (365 days), set
test-time to 0 and make a test sample of the 5 oldest calves.
If 2 or more of these are not susceptible, then test all un-
tested cattle, cull all PIs and set the farm’s disease-free
status to false. Otherwise, set the farm’s disease-free status
to true. In all cases, set the test-status of all tested agents to
true and count the tests and culls for costing reasons.
Vaccination We start by increasing the time since last
vaccination, vac-time forward by one. When this reaches
365, if the farm vaccinates, all susceptible breeders are
vaccinated (i.e. disease-stage changed from 0 to 4), and if
the farm does not vaccinate, all vaccinated breeders (like
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those purchased from another farm) lose protection (dis-
ease-stage changed from 4 to 0). Vac-time is reset to zero.
We will assume both farms vac-time is the same on both
farms.
Cashflow If test = true and test-time = 0, then a test
happened this turn, which gives a testTotalCost is testCost
(a per-capita) times the total number of cattle in the farm.
Other costs and revenues occur at a per-agent basis.
Discounting can be applied here too or applied to the
cashflow output.
APPENDIX 2: MANAGEMENT IN A SINGLE
FARM WHEN BVD IS NOT ALWAYS PRESENT
See Fig. 6.
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